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Memory: Topographical knowledge survives hippocampal damage
Richard G.M. Morris
Study of a patient with damage to the hippocampus and
surrounding neocortex reveals intact topographical
knowledge of his childhood environment. New studies
of spatial memory in animals are also giving insight
into the process by which spatial memory becomes
consolidated over time. 
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Thinking about the conflicting claims of rival theories of
hippocampal function often reminds me of the old joke
about two Edinburgh housewives who were always shout-
ing at each other across the ‘close’ from their upper-floor
tenement windows. They always disagreed, goes the joke,
because they were arguing from different premises. Two
theories of hippocampal function — the ‘declarative
memory’ and ‘cognitive mapping’ theories — are likewise
locked in a seemingly irreconcilable debate about whether
the hippocampus has a general role in memory function,
or one more circumscribed to spatial information. There
are, however, one or two cobblestone alleyways where
these theories are forced to meet. One meeting point has
to do with specifying where relevant memory traces are
stored in the brain, others with whether and, if so, how they
become stabilised or ‘consolidated’ over time. A recent
study of topographical knowledge by an amnesic patient
bears directly on both points. This study is complemented
by other recent work on retrograde amnesia and two
studies using animals concerning the neural activity that
may accompany memory consolidation. 
The original cognitive-mapping theory [1] made the
strong and testable claim that allocentric spatial maps are
created by, and stored in, the hippocampus. The
declarative memory theory, on the other hand, asserts that
the role of the hippocampus is time-limited; it is held to
contribute to a process of ‘memory consolidation’, but not
to be the eventual repository of the traces whose later re-
activation are the basis of conscious memory [2].
Teng and Squire [3] studied a 76 year old man, referred to
as E.P., who grew up in the Castro Valley part of the San
Francisco Bay area but who moved away in his early adult
years. At the age of 68, he suffered a severe attack of Herpes
Simplex Encephalitus, and the virus destroyed most of his
medial temporal lobe, including the hippocampus on both
sides of his brain. A magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
scan revealing the extent of E.P.’s brain damage is shown
in Figure 1. It follows that, if spatial knowledge is created
by and stored in the hippocampus, as the cognitive
mapping theory implies, E.P.’s memory of the Castro
Valley area of his childhood should be lost. In contrast, the
declarative memory theory predicts that he would retain
memories of his childhood neighbourhood, as these would
have been stabilised in the neocortex many years ago.
Both theories predict he should have little idea about the
neighbourhood to which he has moved since becoming
amnesic. As memory for the layout of the streets where we
lived as children is, for most of us, unlikely to be very
good, it was important to compare E.P. with age-matched
control subjects. They should have lived in the same
neighbourhood as children, and also have moved away
around the same time. The experimenters identified five
such people for purposes of comparison.
All six subjects were given four tests of topographical
memory and navigation. These were conducted in the
form of question-and-answer sessions, rather than as real-
time navigation. One test examined the subjects’ ability to
take routes they were likely to have been used frequently;
another was along routes that may have been taken rarely;
a third between places for which the direct route, they
were told, had been blocked off; and the last involved
pointing to specific landmarks. Strikingly, and despite
being profoundly amnesic on conventional tests of antero-
grade and some tests of retrograde amnesia, patient E.P.
performed as well as controls. But when tested on his
knowledge of the San Diego area of California, where he
moved a year after becoming amnesic, he was unable to
answer any of the same sorts of questions. The controls,
by contrast, all did well.
On the face of it, these results provide striking evidence
that the hippocampus cannot be the site, or at least not the
only site, of topographical spatial information in humans.
Moreover, the results are consistent with the general
notion of time-dependent memory consolidation. This is
because there would have been sufficient time between
E.P.’s childhood and his later onset of amnesia for this
topographical information to have become stabilised at
neocortical sites, such that neural activity in the cortex
alone would be sufficient to re-activate the memory.
There are, however, several features of this experiment
that leave room for doubt. First, as Squire has asserted in
previous publications ([4,5] for example), structural MRI
evidence is never as reliable as post-mortem histological
assessment. Selected areas of  E.P.’s hippocampus may be
intact, particularly the more posterior parts that are homol-
ogous with regions shown in animals to be important for
spatial memory [6]. In fact, inspection of the MRI data
raises precisely this possibility. Second, it is striking how
well the subjects did on the topographical memory
tests — scoring about 70% correct albeit with some scatter
across subjects. This level of performance encourages a
certain suspension of disbelief until one reads, in the foot-
notes, that E.P.’s last visit to the Castro Valley area was as
recently as 1993 and that one control subject’s most recent
visit was less than two years ago. 
While recognising that finding subjects who have never
revisited their childhood homes would not be easy, that
such revisits may have occurred repeatedly over the years
puts a different complexion on the results. Specifically,
spatial memory, like other forms of propositional memory,
might be classified as being either ‘episodic’ in character
(about events) or ‘semantic’ (about facts). We acquire
information from the succession of experiences of our lives
but, as similar events unfold, we gradually lose the time-
tags that identify each one uniquely and so accumulate a
generic factual knowledge. It has been argued that access
to the latter may not require the hippocampus [7]. This is
likely to have occurred for the topographical knowledge of
all the subjects of the study, amnesic and control alike,
such that the tests were actually probing factual knowledge
about the Castro Valley area rather than memory for
unique events that occurred at specific places within it. On
this view, a helpful supplement to the tests reported so far
would be to ask E.P. and the control subjects to remember
one or more specific events that happened at school, the
grocery store or at other places in the neighbourhood.
To proponents of the declarative memory theory, however,
neither of these qualifications will carry much weight. First,
even if there is some sparing of posterior hippocampus, the
extent of damage to adjacent neocortex would likely result
in severe deafferentation (loss of neural input). Second, the
results of Reed and Squire’s recent study of retrograde
amnesia [5], involving numerous tests, indicates that the
profile of E.P.’s retrograde amnesia offers no support for a
simple episodic–semantic distinction. Specifically, E.P.
shows an extensive ‘flat’ gradient of retrograde amnesia for
general semantic knowledge while, paradoxically, display-
ing quite good autobiographical memory for events of his
childhood (and even for personal semantic memory). 
The comparison of a range of brain-damaged subjects,
some with circumscribed hippocampal damage, some with
partial damage to more medial cortical structures as well,
and a few with extensive lateral damage strongly suggests
that the severity of retrograde amnesia is related to the
extent of cortical damage. But this pattern, in turn, implies
that the severity of retrograde amnesia has more to do with
damaging sites of storage than it has to do with some
notional period of consolidation lasting months or years.
Retrograde amnesia has long been investigated by
studying people with permanent and selective brain
damage, or animals given circumscribed lesions of these
areas under experimental conditions. Such studies can
establish that the integrity of a brain area is relevant for
memory storage or for consolidation over time; but they
tell us little about the neural mechanisms within those
areas that are responsible for either process. Bontempi and
colleagues [8] have sought direct evidence for time-
dependent neural activity by looking at regional glucose
utilisation in various brain areas of rats during a spatial
memory test conducted shortly (5 days) or long (25 days)
after a learning experience. In each of three areas of the
hippocampal formation — hippocampus, subiculum and
entorhinal cortex — there was a 15–20% decrease in
glucose utilisation at the longer memory delay interval,
unless the conditions of the memory test were changed
from those of original learning. In contrast, activity in
frontal, temporal and anterior cingulate cortex showed an
increase in glucose utilisation at the longer memory delay
Dispatch R891
Figure 1
A weighted magnetic resonance image through the temporal lobes of
patient E.P.. The extent of damage is shown as white shading in the
region of the medial temporal lobes; it includes most of the
hippocampus, although there may be some posterior sparing.
(Reproduced with kind permission of Larry Squire.)
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interval, again unless the memory test involved a change
of circumstances. 
The implication of these observations would appear to be
that hippocampal neural activity is higher when memories
must be retrieved soon after testing, while neocortical
activity is higher when memories are retrieved later on.
Notice that in this kind of experiment, unlike lesion
studies, the brain areas of interest are present and working
at all stages of the experiment — a desirable feature if we
are to understand the neural mechanisms underlying
consolidation. By combining this kind of study with
pharmacological manipulations, it may be possible to get a
handle on what neurotransmitter systems are active during
long-term memory consolidation.
These observations need not imply, however, that
differential neural activity is causally related to changes in
memory performance. A complementary approach has
recently been introduced [9] involving the reversible
inactivation of the hippocampus for periods of as long as a
week. Riedel et al. [9] calibrated their technique, which is
based on the chronic infusion of a water-soluble antagonist
of AMPA-type glutamate receptors, using a combination
of electrophysiology and 2-deoxyglucose autoradiography.
They then went on to describe several behavioural experi-
ments, including one in which the hippocampus was
‘switched-off’ for a week and then ‘switched-on’ again
after the end of several days training in a watermaze.
When the animals were tested 16 days later, with the
hippocampus again working normally, the animals that
had sustained hippocampal inactivation were found to be
poorer at remembering the location within the water maze
of the hidden escape platform than control animals who
had received artificial cerebrospinal fluid. As the animals
were neither trained nor tested during the period of
hippocampal inactivation, the most natural interpretation
is that switching this brain structure off for 7 days
interfered with a memory consolidation process. The
enhanced neural activity observed by Bontempi et al. [8]
for several days after spatial memory training may, there-
fore, be causal with respect to neocortical consolidation,
although alternative interpretations of the inactivation
findings are yet to be ruled out.
The observation [3] that E.P. shows intact topographical
knowledge for a place that he learned about as a child and
had the chance to remind himself about occasionally
thereafter is a challenge to the notion, implicit in cognitive
mapping theory, that all topographic spatial knowledge is
stored in the hippocampus. But where that information is
stored and difficulties that have haunted attempts to
address the process of neocortical memory consolidation in
humans remain as great as ever. It will be some while
before peace reigns in the close.
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